Notre Dame Law School

NDLScholarship
Faculty Lectures and Presentations

Faculty Scholarship

5-9-2014

Avishalom Tor presented at 3rd Haifa-Loyola Conference on
Recent Challenges to Antitrust
Avishalom Tor
Notre Dame Law School, atortest@nd.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_lectures
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Tor, Avishalom, "Avishalom Tor presented at 3rd Haifa-Loyola Conference on Recent Challenges to
Antitrust" (2014). Faculty Lectures and Presentations. 20.
https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_lectures/20

This Lecture is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at NDLScholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Lectures and Presentations by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship.
For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

Boundedly Rational Consumers:
Three Challenges for Antitrust
Avishalom Tor

Recent Challenges to Antitrust
University of Haifa Faculty of Law
May 8-9, 2014

Boundedly Rational Consumers

Three Challenges
1. The prediction challenge
2. The efficiency challenge
3. The welfare challenge

The Prediction Challenge
Inaccurate prediction /
evaluation

Erroneous rules /
enforcement practices

The Efficiency Challenge

Competition      Efficiency

The Welfare Challenge

Competition      Social welfare

The Prediction Challenge
• Familiar…
• Primarily relevant for consumer-directed
aspects of market power
– Aftermarkets
– Bundling, tying, and rebate schemes
– Unilateral effects market definition

• Doctrine / enforcement practices can
accommodate

The Efficiency Challenge
• Substantial & unsurprising empirical evidence
of consumer mistakes
– From both lab and field
– Not universal, but not uncommon

• Basic model: distorted demand, misallocation
– Even under perfect competition

• More advanced models in “behavioral industrial
organization” over the recent decade – what
happens when producers react to consumers’
bounded rationality?
– Sometimes the presence of BR consumers can
improve competitive outcomes compared to a
market populated only by rational consumers
• E.g., “reciprocal” consumers give experience products a
chance but avoid if fail, while rational consumers realize
producers prefer low quality and avoid the market
altogether
(Huck & Tyran, 2007)

– Usually, inefficiencies remain, even under perfect
competition

• Occasionally, increased competition can even reduce
efficiency (compared to diminished competition or
direct regulation)
– Intuitive example: credence goods, when consumers rely
on casual stories and cannot distinguish between skill and
luck (e.g., alternative medicine, mutual funds)
» competition tends to drive price down
» but an increased number of providers increases
likelihood of erroneous, anecdote-based attribution
» Inefficiencies remain even if some providers offer a
quality service
» Firms respond to competitive pressure by creating
artificial product differentiation
(Spiegler, 2006)

• More generally, sellers react strategically in order to exploit,
even facilitate consumer error
– Exploit underestimation of future demand by low (even
free or a negative cost) upfront fees and high per-use fees
later (e.g., credit card features)
– Exploit overestimation of future demand by high
upfront/low per-use fees or larger bundles (e.g., gym
membership)
» competition to attract biased consumers ex-ante is beneficial,
lowering prices of focal service / product
» In both cases, inefficiencies remain under competition

– Facilitate consumer error—complex price schemes for
products, with increased competition leading to a
proliferation of artificially differentiated price schemes

Hence the efficiency challenge…

Competition, Judgment, and Efficiency
• Even a less-than-perfect relationship between
competition and efficiency still offers
meaningful guidance to antitrust law
– Some product markets still approximate standard
model
– Heterogeneity in rationality can reduce effects of
bias, particularly where learning / incentives to
educate consumers exist

• The important question is comparative: how
more competition compares to
less competition (fewer firms with more
power) --- or --- more regulation…
• Both alternatives usually do worse the competition
• Particularly regulation with its many familiar shortcomings
• Note also that regulation is often present already as a
potentially complementary regime in many of the affected
markets
– Professional services involving credence goods,
telecommunications, banking and finance, and so on
– But usually with a focus that is very different from consumer BR
concerns

Competition and Consumer Choice
• The behavioral IO literature examines effects on
market outcomes , studying the impact of
phenomena relating to reference-dependent DM
(framing effects, loss aversion, status quo bias, etc.)
– Loss aversion (LA), for instance, tends to magnify
perceived differences among substitutes in both
price and product features
– Can either soften competition (e.g. moving to a
product with inferior fit/features) or intensify it (e.g.
moving from a less to a more expensive product),
depending on reference point, frame, and so on

. . . but treats “nonstandard”
preferences as given

The Welfare Challenge
(which remains even if consumers make no errors
of judgment, yet manifest constructed choices)
• Extensive evidence of constructed choice
– Expressions of preferences are generally constructed
at the time of valuation / choice
– Construction process shaped by interaction bw/
person and task characteristics
= Highly contingent decision behavior

• Applied and extended by consumer research

Which is why constructed preferences
challenge the competition-welfare link…

Competition, Choice, and Welfare
• Even a less-than-perfect relationship between
competition and welfare still offers
meaningful justification for antitrust law
– Substantial fraction of inherent preferences
– Some preference stabilize over time
– Even constructed preferences often not wholly
divorced from higher-order, “true” preferences
– Most importantly, again, this is a comparative
question
• less competition and choice / regulation of preferences
much worse

